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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chad Lee Williams appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and resisting or
obstructing officers. On appeal, Williams challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 3, 2014, the Boise City Police Department assembled a team of
officers to execute a felony arrest warrant for Cody Bellenbrock. (Tr., p.6, L.19 –
p.14, L.2, p.22, Ls.4-13; State’s Exhibit 1.) The police had received information
that Bellenbrock was staying at an apartment on Wiley Lane in Ada County. (Tr.,
p.8, Ls.11-24.) At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Ryan Thueson and another
officer began surveilling the apartment “to see if it looked like anybody was
home.” (Tr., p.9, L.8 – p.11, L.2.) The officers determined the apartment was
occupied and they called for assistance from other units before they attempted to
contact anybody in the residence. (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-21.)
Approximately a half hour after he began watching the front of the
residence, Officer Thueson saw four individuals, one of whom was later
identified as Williams, exit the apartment. (Tr., p.14, L.11 – p.15, L.11, p.31,
L.17 – p.32, 19.) A “minute or two” later, Officer Thueson and two other officers
approached the front of the apartment. (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-23, p.14, L.23 – p.15,
L.11, p.22, Ls.4-11.) As he approached, Officer Thueson could see the four
individuals who had exited the apartment “standing right in front of the door.”
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(Tr., p.11, L.21 – p.12, L.1.) Officer Thueson shined his flashlight on one of the
individuals, whom he correctly believed was Bellenbrock. (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-18.)
Immediately upon seeing the officer, Bellenbrock fled into the residence and then
out the back door. (Tr., p.12, Ls.16-22.) Officer Thueson pursued Bellenbrock
and, with the assistance of another officer, took him into custody. (Tr., p.12, L.22
– p.13, L.23.) The entire encounter between Officer Thueson and Bellenbrock –
from the time Officer Thueson ran after Bellenbrock to the time the officer took
Bellenbrock into custody and then returned to the front of the apartment – took,
at the most, “[t]hree or four minutes.” (Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.2, p.15, Ls.12-19,
p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.)
After Bellenbrock was in custody, Officer Thueson returned to the front of
the apartment where two other officers were attempting to identify the three other
individuals who were standing outside of the front door. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-10, p.15,
L.24 – p.16, L.12.) As soon as Officer Thueson re-approached the front of the
apartment he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana emanating from the
residence. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-16, p.27, L.25 – p.28, L.7, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.10.)
He spoke to the “homeowner,” who was one of the individuals standing outside
the apartment door, and she admitted there was marijuana and paraphernalia in
the apartment. (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-22, p.17, Ls.10-17, p.32, Ls.6-19.) Based on
“the clear, discernible odor of marijuana coming from the residence,” the
homeowner’s admission that “there was indeed marijuana in the residence,” and
the officer’s “knowledge that Mr. Williams had been in the residence for at least
close to 30 minutes,” Officer Thueson decided to arrest Williams and Roger

2

Jones – the other individual who was standing outside the door of the apartment
– for frequenting. (Tr., p.17, L.21 – p.18, L.11.)
Officer Thueson handcuffed Jones, searched him incident to arrest, and
found marijuana in his pockets. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-9.) Another officer handcuffed
Williams and attempted to hand him over to Officer Thueson to be searched, but
Williams ran away. (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-21, p.19, Ls.9-17.) Officer Thueson caught
up to Williams and tackled him. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24.) Williams “continued to
fight even after he was tackled,” but Officer Thueson was eventually able to
search him incident to arrest. (Tr., p.20, Ls.6-10.) During the search, the officer
found in Williams’ pants pocket “a bag of methamphetamine, a bag of marijuana,
a methamphetamine pipe, a marijuana pipe and a digital scale with marijuana
residue on it.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.11-15.)
The state charged Williams with possession of methamphetamine,
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, frequenting a place
where controlled substances are known to be located, and resisting or
obstructing officers. (R., pp.58-60.) Williams moved to suppress the evidence
against him, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful detention and arrest. (R.,
pp.73-98; see also Tr., p.35, L.16 – p.38, L.3, p.39, L.22 – p.41, L.5.) After a
hearing, the district court denied Williams’ motion, ruling Williams’ initial
detention and subsequent arrest were both constitutionally reasonable.

(R.,

pp.99-100; Tr., p.41, L.10 – p.45, L.7.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Williams reserved the right to
challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal, Williams pled guilty to
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possession of methamphetamine and resisting or obstructing officers, and the
state dismissed the remaining charges.

(R., pp.101-12.)

The district court

imposed an aggregate unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp.165-72, 174-78.)

Williams timely appealed from the judgment.

pp.179-83, 197-201.)
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(R.,

ISSUE
Williams states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Williams’ motion
to suppress because the officers detained Mr. Williams for longer
than necessary and then arrested him without probable cause?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Williams failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Williams Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Williams challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that

officers “detained [him] for longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the detention and then arrested [him] for frequenting without probable cause.”1
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-14.) Williams’ arguments fail. Correct application of the
law to the facts supports the district court’s determinations that Williams’
detention and his subsequent arrest for frequenting were both constitutionally
reasonable.

Even assuming the arrest was unlawful, suppression is not

warranted. By running from officers after he was placed in custody, Williams
committed a new and independent crime that justified both his arrest and the
search that followed.

The district court’s order denying Williams’ motion to

suppress should be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the

1

Williams acknowledges his trial counsel conceded below that officers could
detain him to determine whether he harbored a fugitive and, as such, “he cannot
challenge the legality of his initial detention on appeal.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8
(citing Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21).) He argues, however, that the detention was
unreasonably prolonged beyond any justifiable purpose. (Appellant’s brief, pp.813.) Williams’ trial counsel did not expressly challenge the length of the initial
detention at the hearing on Williams’ motion to suppress. (See generally Tr.)
However, because Williams’ trial counsel addressed the issue in his written
briefing filed in support of the motion to suppress (see R., pp.82-83), the state
assumes the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal.
6

trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Williams’ Initial Detention
Was Constitutionally Reasonable
1.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In
Concluding That Williams’ Initial Detention Was A Constitutionally
Reasonable Measure Taken To Secure The Scene And Ensure
The Safety Of The Officers Executing An Arrest Warrant

Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700

(1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must
be supported by probable cause. Id. at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause
requirement.

For example, it is well settled that a police officer may, in

compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
underway.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).

Additionally, “[i]n the

execution of a search warrant for drugs or contraband at a residence, it is lawful
for police to detain, during the duration of the search, those individuals who are
occupants of the residence.” State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 914, 155 P.3d
712, 715 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 705; State v. Kester, 137
Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457, 460 (Ct. App. 2002)). “Similarly, individuals found
on the premises at the inception of the search whose identity and connection to
the premises are unknown may be detained for the time necessary to determine
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those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the detention.”
Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 914, 155 P.3d at 715 (citing Kester, 137 Idaho at 646, 51
P.3d at 460; State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Ct. App.
2002)).
Relying on Reynolds, the district court ruled officers were justified in
temporarily detaining Williams while they executed the arrest warrant for
Bellenbrock. (Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.5.) The court reasoned:
[I]ndividuals who are found on the premises at the inception of a
search and whose identity and connection to the premises are
unknown may be detained for the time necessary to determine
those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the
detention. That’s State versus Reynolds at 143 Idaho 911. It’s a
Court of Appeals 2007 case.
And so individuals found at the scene where there is a
legitimate – for example, the execution of a search warrant or in
this case an arrest warrant can be detained for a time necessary to
determine who they are and to protect the safety of those present
during the detention.
In this particular case they were executing an arrest warrant
and in response to that, Mr. Bellenbrock … had actually ran [sic] for
a period of time. So there’s nothing unreasonable about the
temporary detention.
(Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.5.)
Williams challenges the district court’s ruling, arguing the exception to the
probable cause requirement articulated in “Reynolds and its predecessors,
including Michigan v. Summers …, only allow[s] law enforcement to detain
occupants of premises subject to a search warrant.”
(emphasis in original).)

(Appellant’s brief, p.9

According to Williams, the justifications that permit

officers to detain persons at the scene of the execution of a search warrant are
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not present in cases such as this one, where officers are executing an arrest
warrant.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) Because, according to Williams,

“Bellenbrock’s arrest warrant could not justify detaining Mr. Williams in the first
place, it similarly cannot justify prolonging the length of Mr. Williams’ detention.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.) Williams’ argument is unpersuasive because it draws a
distinction without a difference and ignores the standard by which all seizures
are to be judged under the Fourth Amendment, i.e. “the ultimate standard of
reasonableness.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700.
In evaluating the reasonableness of any seizure, the court must “balance
the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in
the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective
facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular
detention.” People v. Glaser, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. 1995) (citing Terry, 392
U.S. at 21; Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); accord State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90,
95, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 1999).

Although Summers involved the

detention of individuals during the execution of a search warrant for contraband,
neither that case or any Idaho case decided after it, including Reynolds, require
the existence of a search warrant for contraband as a prerequisite to finding the
detention of an individual to be reasonable. Rather, the existence of a search
warrant “is but one factor the courts consider when determining the
governmental interest involved.” People v. Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 806, 810
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Other factors to be considered include “the interest in
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers” and the facilitation of “the orderly
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completion” of the officers’ task. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03. Just as “the
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may
give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence,” Id.,
the execution of an arrest warrant at a residence occupied by several individuals
likewise raises concerns for officer safety. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,
333 (1990) (acknowledging risks of danger associated with in-home arrests,
including presence of other potentially dangerous individuals).

In such

situations, “[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if
the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03 (citation omitted).
In recognition of the foregoing principles, many courts that have
considered the issue have “concluded that officers entering a residence to
execute an arrest warrant may constitutionally detain the occupants of the
residence for the period of time necessary to safely effectuate the arrest.”
Adams v. Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing United
States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 330 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); Cherrington v. Skeeter,
344 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 797,
n.32 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also, e.g., Way v. State, 101 P.3d 203, 206-09 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2004); Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 811-12; State v. Valdez, 69 P.3d
1052, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). As aptly explained by one federal district
court, such limited detentions are justified when balanced against the legitimate
governmental interest in officer safety:
[D]espite whatever precautions might be taken, it is inevitable that
some potentially dangerous police activities will occur among
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private citizens. These private citizens, while wholly innocent
bystanders, often may introduce additional variables at a time when
the primary and legitimate goal of the police is to secure control of
the situation. Failure to gain complete control of the situation may
endanger the success of the police operation, as well as the safety
of the innocent bystanders and law enforcement officers. Thus,
police have a strong interest in securing the arrest scene, including
if necessary the temporary detention of third persons who may be
present.
Croom v. Balkwill, 672 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting
Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 1994 WL 262598 at *10 (D. Kan. 1994)).
Because police officers executing arrest warrants frequently encounter the same
dangers faced by officers executing search warrants, this Court should hold,
consistent with other jurisdictions that have considered the issue, that “police
have the limited authority to briefly detain those on the scene, even wholly
innocent bystanders, as they execute a search or arrest warrant.” Cherrington,
344 F.3d at 638 (citations omitted).
Applying the above legal principles, and testing Williams’ initial detention
against the “ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment,” Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700, it is clear that the officers’ act of
temporarily detaining Williams while they executed the arrest warrant for
Bellenbrock was constitutionally reasonable.

Officers were executing the

warrant, at night, at an apartment at which at least four individuals were present.
(Tr., p.8, L.6 – p.12, L.4.)

When the officers approached the residence the

subject of the warrant, who was “a known, wanted felon,” fled into the residence
and then out the back door, making it necessary for officers to chase him. (Tr.,
p.12, L.15 – p.13, L.23, p.20, Ls.23-24.)

11

The fact that the officers were

executing an arrest warrant instead of a search warrant did not make them any
less susceptible to risks of danger associated with such confrontations. Indeed,
as Officer Thueson testified, when Bellenbrock fled to avoid arrest the officers
did not know “if he would reenter the residence” to “access weapons,” nor did
they know who the other three individuals at the apartment were, whether they
were armed, or whether, if the officers left them, they would attempt to assist
Bellenbrock in avoiding capture. (Tr., p.20, L.16 – p.21, L.6.) In light of risks
they faced and their legitimate interest in safely and expeditiously executing the
arrest warrant, there can be little doubt that the officers were justified in
“excercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation,” Summers, 452 U.S. at
702-03, including by briefly detaining Williams and the other individuals on scene
“for the period of time necessary to safely effectuate the arrest,” Adams, 17
F.Supp.3d at 502 (citations omitted). Nor can it seriously be contended that
Williams’ detention lasted any longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate
this purpose. The evidence shows that officers detained Williams for, “at most,”
three or four minutes while other officers chased after Bellenbrock and placed
him under arrest. (Tr., p.15, Ls.12-19, p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.) Although officers
continued to detain Williams after that point, they did so not in relation to
execution of the arrest warrant but because they developed suspicion that
Williams was involved in criminal activity. (Tr., p.43, L.6 – p.44, L.14; see also
Sections D and E, infra.)
Despite Williams’ assertions to the contrary, the governmental interests
involved in this case clearly outweighed the brief restraint on his liberty that
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occurred while officers executed the arrest warrant. Because the officers were
justified in detaining Williams for the time it took to execute the arrest warrant,
the district court correctly concluded that Williams’ initial detention was
constitutionally reasonable.
2.

Williams Has Failed To Show Officers Detained Him Longer Than
Reasonably Necessary To Investigate Whether He Had Harbored
A Fugitive

As an alternative to its argument that Williams’ initial detention was
justified by officer safety concerns during the execution of the arrest warrant, the
state also argued below that officers were justified in detaining Williams to
investigate whether he had harbored a fugitive. (R., p.97; see also Tr., p.21,
Ls.7-12 (Officer Thueson testifying “the crime of harboring a fugitive … needed
to be investigated”).)

At the suppression hearing, Williams’ trial counsel

conceded “it was permissible for [officers] to identify Mr. Williams to determine
whether or not he was involved in harboring Mr. Bellenbrock and to conduct an
investigation from there.” (Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21.) The district court did not address
this issue as a basis for its ruling.

This Court may nevertheless uphold the

legality of Williams’ detention on this alternative basis because Williams
conceded any detention for the purpose of determining whether he had harbored
a fugitive was lawful at its inception and, contrary to his arguments on appeal
(see Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13), officers did not detain him for longer than
necessary to effectuate that lawful purpose.

See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129

Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where lower court reaches correct
result by different theory, appellate court will affirm on correct theory).
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It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1968). “An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon
specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho
980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21;
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). An investigative detention
must not only be justified at its inception, but must also be conducted in a
manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App.
2004). “There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted
longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention
and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the
stop.” State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
2008).
Application of the above legal principles to the facts established at the
suppression hearing shows officers did not detain Williams for longer than
necessary to determine whether he had harbored a fugitive. A person harbors a
fugitive if, knowing that a felony has been committed, he “harbor[s] and protect[s]
a person who committed such felony or who has been charged with or convicted
thereof.”

I.C. § 18-205(2).

Williams posits that, to confirm or dispel any
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suspicion that he and the other individuals present at the apartment were
harboring a fugitive, officers only needed to ask them about their relationship to
Bellenbrock – a task that, according to Williams, “would have taken seconds –
not minutes – to accomplish.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Williams’ argument

ignores the evidence. While it is true that two officers detained Williams and his
companions for three or four minutes while Officer Thueson and a fourth officer
arrested Bellenbrock (see Tr., p.15, L.12 – p.17, L.9), that three- or four-minute
detention was not unreasonable considering the information the officers needed
to gather and the totality of the circumstances with which the officers were
confronted. To determine whether any or all of the individuals at the apartment
were guilty of harboring a fugitive, the two officers would have had to talk to all
three individuals, ascertain their identities and respective connections to
Bellenbrock, and determine if any or all of them had “harbor[ed] and protect[ed]”
Bellenbrock, knowing he had committed a felony. That officers were unable to
accomplish these tasks in “seconds,” rather than in the three or four minutes
they detained Williams before developing probable cause that Williams was
guilty of frequenting, is not unreasonable. The evidence shows the officers were
outnumbered and were still in the process of identifying Williams and his two
companions at the conclusion of that three- or four-minute period. (Tr., p.14,
Ls.3-13, p.15, L.12 – p.16, L.12, p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.)
There is certainly nothing inherently unreasonable about two officers
taking three or four minutes to investigate whether any one of the three
individuals had harbored a fugitive. Nor is there any evidence in the record to
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suggest that the officers purposefully delayed their investigation beyond the time
necessary to effectuate its purpose. Because the evidence shows the detention
was reasonable both at its inception and in its scope and duration, the district
court’s ruling that the detention was constitutionally reasonable may be affirmed
on this alternative basis.
D.

Williams Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination
That Police Had Probable Cause To Arrest Him For Frequenting
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969);

Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. “For an arrest to be considered lawful,
it must be based on probable cause” to believe the arrestee has committed a
crime.

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009)

(citations omitted).
Determining the existence of probable cause is “a practical, commonsense decision” whether, given all the circumstances, there is “a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983). Probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal
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activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of such activity. Id. at
244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is
involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The facts known to the officers must
be judged in accordance with “the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Application of the law to the facts established at the suppression hearing
supports the district court’s determination that officers had probable cause to
arrest Williams for frequenting. Under Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), a person is
guilty of frequenting if he is “present at or on premises of any place where he
knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are
being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be
given away.”

It is clear from the evidence that Williams was present at an

apartment where marijuana was being held for distribution, delivery, or use.
Immediately upon returning to the front of the apartment after arresting
Bellenbrock, Officer Thueson smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating
from the apartment, and the homeowner admitted there was marijuana and
paraphernalia inside the residence. (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-22, p.17, Ls.10-17, p.27,
L.25 – p.28, L.7, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.10.) The only question is whether police
had probable cause to believe Williams knew that marijuana was being held for
distribution, delivery or use at the residence. Evidence that Williams was present
for at least 30 minutes in an apartment that emitted a strong odor of raw
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marijuana and in which the homeowner admitted there was actually marijuana
and paraphernalia (see Tr., p.18, Ls.4-11) was sufficient evidence from which
the officers could reasonably infer that Williams was aware of the drug activities
around him.
Williams argues otherwise, contending that to meet its burden of
establishing officers had probable cause to arrest Williams for frequenting, the
state was required to present evidence showing that Williams actually knew
there was marijuana in the apartment.

(Appellant’s brief, p.14.)

Williams’

argument is unavailing because it is contrary to applicable precedent. Probable
cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only a showing
that the information possessed by officers “would lead a person of ordinary care
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime
has been committed by the arrestee.” State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140,
206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Gates, 462 U.S.
at 244-45 n.3 (probable cause does not require actual showing of criminal
activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of such activity).
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is instructive. In Pringle, police
stopped a car with three people in it. Id. at 368. They searched the car after
obtaining consent from the driver and found a large amount of cash in a roll in
the glove compartment and baggies of cocaine tucked behind the folded-up
armrest in the back seat. Id. After all three men in the car denied knowledge of
the drugs and cash, officers arrested all three. Id. at 368-69. Pringle, the frontseat passenger, later admitted that the drugs and cash were his. Id. After being
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convicted, Pringle appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence,
asserting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 369. The Maryland
Court of Appeals agreed and held that, “absent specific facts tending to show
Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of
cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was a front seat passenger in a car
being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest
for possession.” Id. at 369 (internal quotes and brackets omitted). However, this
analysis was unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Id. at 370-74.
The

Supreme

Court

reiterated

that

probable

cause

deals with

“probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances” and consists of a
“reasonable ground for belief of guilt” that is “particularized with respect to the
person to be searched or seized.” Id. at 371 (internal quotes omitted). “Finely
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
probable-cause decision.”

Id. (internal quotes and brackets omitted).

It

reasoned that the presence of cocaine and a significant amount of cash in the
car where it was accessible to all three occupants, in combination with the three
occupants having provided no information as to ownership of the cash or
cocaine, created “an entirely reasonable inference … that any or all three of the
occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the
cocaine.” Id. at 373.
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If presence in the car under the facts of Pringle was sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe Pringle had both knowledge and dominion and control
over the cocaine, Williams’ presence in the apartment under the facts of this
case is sufficient to establish only knowledge.

Again, before they arrested

Williams, officers had evidence that Williams was present for at least 30 minutes
in an apartment in which there was an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana and
in which the homeowner admitted marijuana and drug paraphernalia were
actually present. (Tr., p.18, Ls.4-11.) Although the evidence that Williams knew
there was marijuana in the apartment may have been less than that required for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance, it was certainly a
reasonable inference for officers to conclude that persons present in the
apartment for a prolonged time would have knowledge of the marijuana that was
present and that officers smelled immediately upon approaching the front door.
The police reasonably inferred Williams’ knowledge of the presence of
drugs from his extended presence in an apartment that smelled strongly of raw
marijuana. The police did not have to assume that Williams was oblivious to the
drug activity around him. Williams’ request that this Court do so is contrary to
the applicable legal standards and fails to show error by the trial court. Because
officers had probable cause to arrest Williams for frequenting, the subsequent
search of his person was a valid search incident to that arrest. Williams has
failed to show any basis for suppression.
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E.

Even If Officers Lacked Probable Cause To Arrest Williams For
Frequenting, Suppression Is Not Warranted Because, By Running From
Police, Williams Committed A New And Independent Crime That Justified
His Arrest And The Search That Followed
For the reasons set forth in Section D, supra, officers had probable cause

to arrest Williams for frequenting.

However, even assuming they did not,

suppression is not required. Officer Thueson discovered the evidence Williams
seeks to have suppressed only after Williams ran from the scene of his
detention. (Tr., p.18, L.12 – p.20, L.15.) Because, for the reasons that follow,
Williams’ act of running constituted a new and independent crime for which there
existed probable cause to arrest, the subsequent search was a valid search
incident to arrest.
As previously discussed, “a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest”
is an exception to the warrant requirement and “permits officers to search
individuals who have been lawfully arrested.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
815-16, 203 P.3d 1203, 1214-15 (2009) (citations omitted). An arrest is lawful if
it is based on probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Id.
at 816, 203 P.3d at 1215 (citations omitted).

That is, “the facts and

circumstances known to the officer” must be such as to “warrant a prudent man
in believing that the offense has been [or is being] committed.”

Id. (internal

quotations and citations omitted, brackets in original).
In this case, even assuming officers lacked probable cause to arrest
Williams for frequenting, the search that yielded the evidence in this case was a
valid search incident to arrest because, at the time Officer Thueson conducted
the search, he had probable cause to arrest Williams for resisting and
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obstructing an officer, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-705. As explained by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop, that code section “makes it a crime to ‘willfully
resist[], delay[] or obstruct[] any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to
discharge, … any duty of his office.’” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 817, 203 P.3d at
1216 (quoting I.C. § 18-705) (brackets and ellipses in original). The Court has
interpreted the term “duty,” as it is used in the statute, to mean “only those lawful
and authorized acts of a public officer.”

Id. (internal quotations, citation and

footnote omitted). Thus, whether Williams’ arrest for resisting and obstructing
was lawful depends on whether, by running away, Williams was obstructing
officers in the performance of some lawful duty. Correct application of the law to
the facts established at the suppression hearing shows that he was.
At the time Williams fled, it appears that officers had not yet confirmed or
dispelled what Williams’ counsel conceded below was a reasonable suspicion
that Williams may have been harboring a fugitive. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21.)
Moreover, for the reasons already set forth in Section D, supra, and incorporated
here by reference, the facts available to the officers gave rise, at the very least,
to a reasonable suspicion that Williams had committed the crime of frequenting.
See State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (defendant’s
presence at house suspected of drug activity gave rise to a reasonable inference
that defendant was involved in the illegal activity). Even assuming the facts
available to the officers were not sufficient to justify Williams’ arrest for
frequenting, Williams would still have been subject to a lawful investigatory
detention from which he was not free to run away. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
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1, 30-31 (investigatory detention justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is underway).

Because Williams was lawfully detained at least upon

reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in criminal activity, his act of running
from the detention actually obstructed the officers in the performance of their
official, lawful duties. The officers were thus justified in arresting Williams for
resisting and in searching him incident to that arrest. Williams has failed to show
any error in the denial of his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
denial of Williams’ motion to suppress.
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